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SUMMARY
In Van Rensburg v Obiang, the High Court (Western Cape 
Division) awarded the plaintiff damages for the torture, unlawful 
arrest, and detention to which the plaintiff was subjected by the 
respondent’s subordinates in Equatorial Guinea. However, the 
court does not clearly explain how the respondent was responsible 
for the applicant’s torture and the legal basis on which it made the 
order for damages. In this article, the author argues that the court’s 
order is debatable for the following reasons. The evidence before 
the court did not prove that the defendant had committed torture 
within the meaning of art. 1 of the UN Convention against Torture 
and sec. 3 of the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons 
Act; some of the acts attributed to the defendant as torture did 
not amount to torture; there was no legal basis on which the court 
based its order to award damages to the plaintiff for the torture 
committed abroad.
1. INTRODUCTION
The right to freedom from torture is protected under sec. 
12(1) of the South African Constitution and one of the 
few non-derogable rights. This right is also protected in 
some of the international instruments ratified by South 
Africa. These include the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (art. 5), the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (art. 37(a)), the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (art. 16), and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 7). Torture 
is also prohibited by the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984) (the UN Convention 
against Torture). In 2013, South Africa’s Parliament 
enacted the Prevention and Combating of the Torture 
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of Persons Act1 to domesticate the UN Convention against Torture. Art. 14 
of the UN Convention against Torture requires states parties to put in place 
measures for victims of torture to obtain redress. However, art. 14 is silent on 
whether it is applicable to torture committed abroad. Sec. 7 of the Prevention 
and Combating of Torture of Persons Act provides that “[n]othing contained in 
this Act affects any liability which a person may incur under the common law 
or any other law”. In Van Rensburg v Obiang,2 the High Court found that the 
plaintiff, a South African citizen, was tortured in Equatorial Guinea. The court 
awarded him damages. However, the court did not explain the legal basis on 
which it awarded the plaintiff damages. In this article, the author argues, inter 
alia, that the court did not have a legal basis to award the plaintiff damages for 
torture committed in Equatorial Guinea. The article first details the facts and 
decision in the case. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION IN THE CASE OF VAN RENSBURG v 
OBIANG
2.1 Facts
The plaintiff, a South African citizen, was in Equatorial Guinea to do business 
with the respondent and his close associates. However, in October 2003, 
he was arrested by the officers of the “Rapid Intervention Force [RIF], a 
division of the Equatorial Guinea police at the instance of” the defendant’s 
uncle (Angabe).3 After his arrest, he was detained for over a year without 
being charged or given reasons for his detention.4 He claimed damages for 
the “human rights abuses, torture, inhumane and degrading treatment that 
he suffered while he was kept as a prisoner and/or detained without trial for 
a long period of time” in Equatorial Guinea.5 All the alleged violations took 
place in “Equatorial Guinea in facilities under the command and control of 
the defendant” who was the second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea and 
Minister for Defence and Security.6 He argued that, at the time of his arrest 
and detention, the defendant was “the Minister in charge of state security 
and prisons in Equatorial Guinea and was responsible for his unlawful arrest, 
imprisonment and torture”.7 This was so because the defendant “served as 
the political head’ and was “in charge of the armed forces, police, security, 
border control, prisons and detention facilities in Equatorial Guinea including 
the facilities in which the plaintiff was detained and tortured”.8 He “controls” 
the Rapid Intervention Force “that arrested him several times as well as the 
1 Prevention and Combating of the Torture of Persons Act 13/2013.
2 Van Rensburg v Obiang (21748/2014) [2021] ZAWCHC 128 (18 June 2021).
3 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 4.
4 Van Rensburg v Obiang:paras. 8-9.
5 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 2.
6 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 3.
7 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 8.
8 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 3.
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prison in which he was held”.9 The plaintiff argued that, while in prison after 
being arrested by the RIF on the orders of Angabe, the defendant “called” the 
prison and “ordered that the plaintiff be detained”.10 The plaintiff testified that, 
subsequent to that order,
he was tightly handcuffed so much so that his wrists were cut. His 
hands were handcuffed to a rail in one of the rooms in a dungeon. He 
witnessed inmates being tortured in his presence in prison. He was later 
thrown in a small cell crammed with about thirty inmates. The plaintiff 
was further tortured by other inmates in the cell. His arms ached from 
being handcuffed. He found it difficult to breathe in the room as it was 
hot and humid. He could not even swat a cloud of mosquitos away as 
his hands were cuffed behind his back. The floor of the cell was slippery 
and covered with human blood and vomit …[T]he toilets were full of 
excrements. He had to ask an inmate to unbutton his jeans so that he 
could relieve himself. He spent sleepless nights sitting against the wall. 
It was pitch dark in the cell and sweaty bodies pressed up against him.11
He spent a night in prison and the next day, “he was forced to sign a document 
in prison by a personal assistant of Angabe, he was released to go to his 
apartment where he lived before he was re-arrested”.12 After a few days at 
his flat, Angabe ordered him to meet him at his house. While at Angabe’s 
house, “the RIF handcuffed him and threw him into the back of the police van 
and he was taken back to [prison where] [h]e experienced the same appalling 
conditions … as before. The cell in which he was incarcerated was even more 
overcrowded than the previous cell”.13 He subsequently appeared before 
a judge who “advised him that Angabe had laid a charge of theft against 
him”.14 He defended himself before the judge and was acquitted. The judged 
ordered his release. However, while at the airport about to board his flight to 
South Africa,
Angabe appeared from the terminal building and instructed a police 
man to arrest the plaintiff. Thereafter, the RIF arrived, manhandled him 
and took him to custody at the airport. He was later taken to Black 
Beach Prison by police officers. Black Beach prison is known to be one 
of the cruellest prisons in the world … [H]is experience in this prison 
indeed confirmed the fact that it was one of the cruellest in the world. 
The prison cells were tiny and overcrowded. Inmates were packed into 
every available space.15
He explained the horrible prison conditions:
[T]here were about four hundred prisoners at any given time in that 
prison. There were only two bathrooms to serve this prison population. 
He witnessed … inmates being beaten and others stabbing each 
9 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 8.
10 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 10.
11 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 10.
12 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 11.
13 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 11.
14 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 12.
15 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 12.
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other …; inmates being raped; some inmates executed by the firing 
squad; and the armed guards shooting and killing each other after 
drinking beer. He further witnessed many dead bodies of prisoners who 
succumbed from being beaten removed from the cell … [T]his was a 
fact of life in that prison and everybody expected to die at any time.16
He also testified that, while in prison, the South African ambassador to 
Equatorial Guinea visited him and “told him that it was the defendant who 
was behind his incarceration”.17 He added that, in December 2015, while 
the defendant and Angabe were out of the country, he was assisted by 
“other officials” to leave the country and “escape this gruesome torture”.18 In 
other words, “he was detained for a total of 549 days, of which 423 he was 
imprisoned in” a notorious prison.19 
On the basis of that evidence, the court observed that, as a result of “his 
incarceration and torture”, the plaintiff was affected “tremendously”.20 For 
example, he was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and panic 
attacks.21 His evidence was corroborated by the reports of clinical and forensic 
psychologists who assessed him and who detailed how his detention in those 
horrible conditions affected and will continue to affect him.22 An actuary also 
submitted a report which estimated the “value of earnings that the plaintiff 
would have accrued had he not been incarcerated” in Equatorial Guinea for 
over a year.23
2.2 The decision
Against that background, the court held that the plaintiff’s evidence had been 
“uncontested” and that the evidence showed that “the plaintiff was severely 
tortured”.24 The court highlighted the business relationship between the 
plaintiff, Angabe and the defendant. It held that the plaintiff’s “incarceration 
was effected, not by an order of court or a judge or in terms of some legislative 
provision, but by the acts of the RIF having received instructions from the 
defendant”.25 The court reiterated that
[t]he RIF is a division of the security services in Equatorial Guinea falling 
under the direct control of the defendant. The RIF was subject to the 
control of the defendant and nobody else. The order of the defendant 
to arrest the plaintiff constituted a wrongful act that attracted delictual 
liability.26
16 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 13.
17 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 14.
18 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 14.
19 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 7.
20 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 15.
21 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 15.
22 Van Rensburg v Obiang:paras. 16-18.
23 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 19.
24 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 20.
25 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 20.
26 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 20.
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The court also agreed with earlier case law that, “in ordering the RIF to arrest 
and detain the plaintiff, the defendant was advancing private interests and not 
the security of the state”.27 The court added that, in earlier case law, it was 
held that the defendant “abused his power and ensured that the plaintiff was 
incarcerated, abused and tortured”.28 This was done by detaining the plaintiff 
in “appalling condition[s] for an extended period of time in an endeavour to 
induce him to settle a private debt that arose from an agreement that went 
wrong”.29 The court also held that
[i]t is undeniable that the plaintiff was tortured outside the boarders 
[sic] of the Republic of South Africa … [T]his court’s jurisdiction to hear 
this matter is based on the final attachment order that was confirmed 
and endorsed by the full bench of this court. Torture is a crime against 
humanity. Further, there is a clear and absolute prohibition of torture 
in international law. The prohibition applies even in times of national 
emergencies or wars, and there are no exceptions or justifications.30
Against that background, the court pointed out that both South Africa and 
Equatorial Guinea ratified the UN Convention against Torture and that art. 
2(2) of this Convention provides that the prohibition of torture is absolute.31 
The court also referred to art. 4 of the Convention against Torture and held 
that it requires states parties to the Convention to criminalise torture.32 It also 
referred to the definition of torture under art. 1 of the UN Convention against 
Torture and held that, according to that definition,
[t]he crime has two objective elements. First, it comprises ‘any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, physical or mental’, is inflicted on a 
person; and second, it is committed ‘by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity’.33 
The court also referred to the South African Prevention and Combating 
of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 and held that it domesticates the 
Convention against Torture and also defines torture.34 The court cited sec. 
12 of the South African Constitution and art. 5 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and held that they both protect the right to freedom from 
torture.35 It also referred to case law from the Constitutional Court to illustrate 
that the Constitutional Court relied on the UN Convention against Torture for 
its definition of torture.36 Against that background, the court held that “the 
27 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 21.
28 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 21.
29 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 21.
30 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 22.
31 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 22.
32 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 23.
33 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 23.
34 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 23.
35 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 24.
36 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 24. It referred to Mohamed and Another v President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Society for the Abolition of the Death 
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evidence that was presented by the plaintiff is overwhelming that he was 
arrested, tormented and tortured”.37 The court explained how the plaintiff was 
arrested, detained, charged, acquitted by the Judge, and left the country.38 The 
court added that the documents filed by both the plaintiff and the defendant 
showed that “nothing [was] presented before court that proved or suggested 
that the arrest and detention was justified.”39 The court also explained the 
conditions in which the plaintiff was detained.40 It held that the “defendant is 
liable to compensate the plaintiff for unlawful arrest and detention and for the 
torture of the plaintiff”.41 In assessing the damages for unlawful arrest and 
detention, the court relied on South African case law and stressed that
[u]nlawful arrest and detention constitutes [sic] a serious inroad into 
the freedom and the rights of an individual. It is trite that the inquiry 
into unlawful arrest and detention seeks to determine the extent to 
which the various affected rights of personality were impaired and their 
duration … The inquiry involve [sic] both a subjective element based on 
the emotional effect of the wrong committed to the plaintiff such as the 
humiliation or anguish of suffering the injustice, the loss of self-esteem 
and respect, and an objective impairment based on the external effect 
of the wrong such as loss of reputation in the eyes of the others.42
The court also referred to a textbook on South African law on damages for 
unlawful arrest and detention43 and to jurisprudence from the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to the effect that
[a]n unlawful interference with a person’s right to liberty is not only 
a common law issue, but is also a constitutional infringement. The 
effect of constitutionally entrenching rights is that the entrenchment 
of fundamental rights and values in the Bill of rights enhances their 
protection and afford them a higher status.44 
The court relied on South African case law on awarding damages for unlawful 
arrest and detention45 and held that “[t]he object of the award of compensation 
is to place the plaintiff in a position he would have been in but for the 
Penalty in South Africa and Another Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).
37 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 25.
38 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 25. He bribed the head of prison and a judge. See 
Obiang v Van Rensburg and Another [2019] 4 All SA 287 (WCC):par. 17.
39 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 25.
40 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 26.
41 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 27.
42 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 28.
43 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 29. It referred to Neethling et al. 2004.
44 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 30. It referred to the cases of Thandani v Minister 
of Law and Order 1991 (1) SA 702; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 
[2002] 4 AII SA 346 (SCA).
45 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 31-42. These cases were Rahim and 14 Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2015 (4) SA 433 (SCA); Ochse v King William’s Town 
Municipality 1990 (2) SA 855; Minister of Safety and Security v Tyulu 2009 (2) 
SACR 282 (SCA), and Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd 1957 (3) SA 284 (D).
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commission of delict and not to enrich him”.46 The court awarded him general 
damages accordingly.47 The court also awarded him damages for loss of past 
and future income.48 This judgment raised very important issues with regard 
to compensating South Africans for torture committed against them outside 
South Africa. These issues are discussed next. 
3. ANALYSING THE JUDGMENT
In the judgment, the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to torture while in 
prison. The court agreed that he was indeed tortured. In concluding that the 
plaintiff was tortured, the court referred to the definition of torture under art. 
1 of the UN Convention against Torture. As the court rightly pointed out, the 
UN Convention against Torture was domesticated in South Africa through the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act. This raises the question 
as to whether the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff’s torture, as the 
court found. To answer this question, one should refer to the definition of torture 
under art. 1 of the UN Convention against Torture – the same definition, with 
minor differences,49 is included in sec. 3 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture of Persons Act. Art. 1 of the UN Convention against Torture defines 
torture to mean:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions.
For the plaintiff to succeed in his claim that he was subjected to torture, he had 
to prove that the act(s) in question amounted to torture within the meaning of art. 
1 of the UN Convention against Torture. Much as the plaintiff was subjected to 
treatment, which could be classified as torture, the court’s conclusion that the 
acts of torture were attributable to the defendant is debatable for the following 
reasons. Although there was evidence, albeit hearsay, that the defendant 
ordered the plaintiff’s detention, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence 
to show that he ordered the plaintiff’s mistreatment. In fact, the defendant 
denied any knowledge of the plaintiff “plight” in Equatorial Guinea.50 The court’s 
conclusion that the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff’s mistreatment 
was based on the fact that he was in effective control of the RIF and was also 
the Minister responsible for prisons. In effect, the court approached the issue 
46 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 43.
47 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 59.1.
48 Van Rensburg v Obiang:paras. 44-59.
49 See Mujuzi 2015:339-355.
50 Obiang v Van Rensburg and Another:par. 54.
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as if it was dealing with the question of superior responsibility – the superior 
is punished for the offences committed by his subordinates, or for failing 
to prevent the subordinates from violating the law, or for failing to take the 
necessary steps to punish his subordinates for violating the law. This concept 
is well-established in international criminal law.51 If the court had not adopted 
this reasoning, one would have expected it to explain in which capacity 
the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff’s torture within the definition 
of torture under art. 1 of the UN Convention against Torture. The evidence 
showed that the defendant was not the direct perpetrator of the torture. In 
other words, the pain or suffering was not inflicted by the defendant personally. 
In that case, he could only be held accountable for the plaintiff’s torture if 
there was evidence that he had instigated it or that it was committed with his 
consent or acquiescence. There was no evidence to prove any of these three. 
It, therefore, means that holding the defendant accountable for the plaintiff’s 
torture remains debatable. Without the evidence linking the defendant to the 
acts of torture, the court appears to have held him accountable for the horrible 
prison conditions in which the plaintiff was detained. In other words, in his 
capacity as Minister responsible for prisons, he should have ensured that the 
prison standards in his country met international standards.
Another shortcoming with the court’s judgment is that some acts of “torture” 
by private individuals were attributed to the defendant. The court found that, 
while in prison, “the plaintiff was further tortured by other inmates in the cell”.52 
Although it is not uncommon for South African courts to erroneously find 
that private persons committed torture,53 the definitions of torture in the UN 
Convention against Torture and the South African Prevention and Combating 
51 Art. 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). See 
generally, Werle & Jessberger 2014:222-223. In The Prosecutor v. Bosco 
Ntaganda (Separate opinion of Judge Luz Del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza on Mr 
Ntaganda’s appeal) (ICC-01/04-02/06-2666-Anx3) (30 March 2021) (Appeals 
Chamber):par. 296: “[S]uperior responsibility is a residual mode of liability that, 
in contexts of mass criminality where crimes are often perpetrated through 
organised power apparatuses, can only be resorted to when other more 
appropriate modes of liability cannot be established.” In The Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08) (21 March 2016):par. 171, the Trial 
Chamber held that “Article 28 provides for a mode of liability, through which 
superiors may be held criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court committed by his or her subordinates.”
52 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 10.
53 S v Tshikolo and Others (CC44/2020) [2020] ZAECGHC 136 (27 November 
2020):par. 9 (the accused were convicted of the murder and assault of their 
neighbour); Pieterse v S (A214/19) [2020] ZAWCHC 62 (2 June 2020):par. 6 
(the appellant raped and murdered his deceased); L K v S (A162/2019) [2020] 
ZAFSHC 14 (10 February 2020):par. 21 (the appellant ‘tortured’ his former 
girlfriend); E A and Others v Minister of Police (14/41567) [2019] ZAGPJHC 9 
(12 February 2019):par. 31 (the court held that ‘it stands to reason that whoever 
is detained unlawfully suffers unexplainable pain and psychological torture’); 
S v Saunders (SS64/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 147 (7 November 2018):par. 
250 (the accused convicted of murder and rape of the deceased); Binjane v S 
(A131/2020) [2021] ZAGPPHC 529 (12 August 2021):paras. 15, 23 and 28.
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of Torture of Persons Act show that torture can only be committed by a public 
official, or by a person acting in an official capacity, or by a private person 
“with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity”. The drafting history of the Prevention and Combating 
of Torture of Persons Act shows that the decision to provide that the offence 
of torture can only be committed by public officials was deliberate. As one 
of the members of Parliament submitted during the second reading of the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill:
Several submissions wanted us to also criminalise acts by private 
individuals, but that is not the purpose of this Bill, nor is it in line with the 
convention. Any offences by private individuals can be dealt with under 
the common law.54
Therefore, the plaintiff’s mistreatment by his fellow inmates would have been 
torture if there was evidence that the inmates had mistreated the plaintiff “at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of” the defendant as a 
public official. 
Another criticism is that the court appears to have blurred the distinction 
between torture as a crime against humanity, on the one hand, and torture 
as a discrete crime, on the other. In explaining the abhorrent manner in 
which the plaintiff was treated, the court correctly observed that “[t]orture is a 
crime against humanity”.55 The UN Convention against Torture and the South 
African Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act deal with torture 
as a discrete crime – which was the subject matter of the case in question. 
On the other hand, torture as a crime against humanity is governed by the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act.56
It is not clear on which basis the court awarded damages to the plaintiff for 
the torture. One has to recall that South African law, as a general rule, does not 
have extra-territorial application.57 Whereas the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture of Persons Act provides that South African courts have jurisdiction 
over persons who have committed torture abroad, this is, in the context of 
criminal liability, for torture. Thus, sec. 6 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture of Persons Act provides that
(1) A court of the Republic has jurisdiction in respect of an act committed 
outside the Republic which would have constituted an offence under 
section 4 (1) or (2) had it been committed in the Republic, regardless 
of whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the place of its 
commission, if the accused person – (a) is a citizen of the Republic; 
(b) is ordinarily resident in the Republic; (c) is, after the commission of 
the offence, present in the territory of the Republic, or in its territorial 
waters or on board a ship, vessel, offshore installation, a fixed platform 
54 Submission by Mrs DA Schäfer, Proceedings of the National Assembly 
(14 November 2012):18.
55 Van Rensburg v Obiang:par. 22.
56 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002.
57 See Okah v S and Others [2016] 4 All SA 775 (SCA); 2017 (1) SACR 1 (SCA). 
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or aircraft registered or required to be registered in the Republic and 
that person is not extradited pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention, or 
(d) has committed the offence against a South African citizen or against 
a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.
(2) If an accused person is alleged to have committed an offence 
contemplated in section 4 (1) or (2) outside the territory of the Republic, 
prosecution for the offence may only be instituted against such person 
on the written authority of the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
contemplated in section 179 (1) (a) of the Constitution, who must also 
designate the court in which the prosecution must be conducted.58
Sec. 4(1) of the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act provides 
that a person convicted of torture is “liable to imprisonment, including 
imprisonment for life”. The Act is silent on the issue of compensation for 
victims of torture. However, sec. 7 of the Act provides that “[n]othing contained 
in this Act affects any liability which a person may incur under the common 
law or any other law”. The drafting history of sec. 7 shows that it is aimed at 
giving effect to art. 14 of the UN Convention against Torture.59 Art. 14 is to the 
effect that
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim 
of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right 
to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as 
full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the 
victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be 
entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other 
persons to compensation which may exist under national law.
The drafting history of art. 14 of the UN Convention against Torture shows that 
the initial draft provided that:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim 
of an act of torture be redressed and have an enforceable right 
to fair and adequate compensation including the means for 
his [rehabilitation]. In the event of the death of the victim as a 
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to 
compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other 
persons to compensation which may exist under national law.60
58 Kouwenhoven v DPP (Western Cape) and Others (288/2021) [2021] ZASCA 120 
(22 September 2021):par. 62.
59 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill [B21-2012]: Briefing by 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 12 June 2012. Available 
at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14555/.
60 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 
Thirty-seventh session, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, E/CI.4/L.1576, (6 March 1981):par. 40.
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The Working Group mainly discussed the word ‘rehabilitation’ and “decided 
to qualify that word by adopting the expression ‘for as full rehabilitation as 
possible’”.61 The Working Group also decided “to add the words ‘committed in 
any territory under its jurisdiction’ after the word ‘torture’”.62 Art. 14, as adopted 
(in 1980) by the Working Group “by consensus” provided that:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the 
victim of an act of torture committed in any territory under its 
jurisdiction be redressed and have an enforceable right to fair 
and adequate compensation including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim 
as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled 
to compensation. 
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other 
persons to compensation which may exist under national law.63
Thus, the intention of the drafters of the Convention was to limit the application 
of art. 14 to “an act of torture committed in any territory” of the state party. In 
other words, victims of torture were not to obtain redress for torture committed 
abroad. However, the phrase is missing in the 1983 and 1984 drafts of the 
Convention.64 When the final draft of the UN Convention against Torture was 
adopted, the words “an act of torture committed in any territory under its 
jurisdiction” were missing. It remains unclear at which stage those words were 
omitted.65 The United States has submitted that those words were deleted 
by mistake and that is why it has argued that it has no obligation to enact 
legislation providing for redress for victims of torture committed abroad.66 
Whether or not art. 14 provides for universal civil jurisdiction and 
consequently jurisdiction on courts to award damages for torture committed 
abroad is an issue over which academics67 and courts have disagreed. For 
example, in Jones v Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia & 
61 Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:par. 41.
62 Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:par. 42.
63 Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:par. 43.
64 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 
39th session, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (E/GN.4/
I983/L.2), (28 February 1983):29; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, 40th session, Report of the Working Group on 
a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, E/CN. 4/1984/L. 2 (20 February 1984):17.
65 Naït-Liman v Switzerland (Application no. 51357/07)(15 March 2018):par. 49.
66 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:paras. 50-51.
67 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:paras. 56-58. The Court lists publications in which 
authors have interpreted art. 14 differently. Those who have argued that art. 14 
applies to torture committed abroad include Hall 2007; Grover 2010:33; Pfander 
2017:108; da Costa 2012:266. For a contrary view, see Kloth 2010:266. 
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Ors,68 the House of Lords held that “article 14 of the Torture Convention 
does not provide for universal civil jurisdiction. It appears that at one stage 
of the negotiating process the draft contained words, which mysteriously 
disappeared from the text, making this clear.”69 Likewise, the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales held that art. 14 of the UN Convention against Torture “does 
not unequivocally indicate that each State party to the Torture Convention is 
obliged to provide a universal civil jurisdiction available to victims of torture 
seeking redress in respect of state activity in any other country”.70 In Naït-
Liman v Switzerland,71 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights surveyed legislation of 39 member states and concluded that “only [T]he 
Netherlands recognise universal civil jurisdiction in respect of acts of torture”72 
and that “[t]he other Contracting States studied do not recognise universal 
international jurisdiction before the civil courts, whether for acts of torture or for 
other criminal acts or offences”.73 The court also surveyed jurisprudence and 
practice of the Committee against Torture74 and jurisprudence from Canada, 
the United States, and European Union law,75 and emphasised:
[T]he broad international consensus recognising the existence of a 
right for victims of acts of torture to obtain appropriate and effective 
compensation … While there is little doubt as to the binding effect of 
this right on the States with regard to acts of torture perpetrated on the 
territory of the forum State or by persons within its jurisdiction, the same 
does not apply to acts committed by third States or persons under their 
jurisdiction.76
The court added that, although the Committee against Torture (as illustrated 
below) indicated in its General Comment that art. 14 has no geographical limit, 
its jurisprudence states that it “has shown a more reserved attitude towards 
the geographical scope of Article 14.”77 The court also held that:
[U]nlike in civil matters, universal jurisdiction is relatively widely 
accepted by the States with regard to criminal matters, a situation 
which is reflected in the fact that Article 5 § 2 of the Convention against 
Torture clearly provides for universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, 
in contrast to Article 14, which is more ambiguous with regard to its 
geographical scope.78
68 Jones v. Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia & Ors [2006] UKHL 
26 (14 June 2006).
69 Jones v. Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia & Ors:par. 25.
70 Li v Zhou [2014] NSWCA 176 (5 June 2014):par. 78.
71 Naït-Liman v Switzerland (Application no. 51357/07)(15 March 2018).
72 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 69.
73 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 70.
74 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:paras. 52-55. The Committee against Torture is the 
enforcement body of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and is established under art. 17 of the 
Convention. For its mandate, see arts 20-22 of the Convention.
75 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:paras. 73-93.
76 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 97.
77 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 54.
78 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 178.
150
Journal for Juridical Science 2021:46(2) Case Note
The court added that:
[A]s it currently stands, international treaty law also fails to recognise 
universal civil jurisdiction for acts of torture, obliging the States to make 
available, where no other connection with the forum is present, civil 
remedies in respect of acts of torture perpetrated outside the State 
territory by the officials of a foreign State.79
However, the Canadian Supreme Court and the Committee against Torture 
have come to a different conclusion in this regard. For example, in Kazemi 
Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran,80 the Supreme Court of Canada referred to 
art. 14 of the UN Convention against Torture and held that, “[o]n a plain reading, 
Article 14 imposes an obligation on state parties to ensure that all victims 
of torture from their countries can obtain redress and ha[ve] an enforceable 
right to fair and adequate compensation”. The text provides no indication that 
the “act of torture” must occur within the territory of the state party for the 
obligation to be engaged. If a state undertakes to ensure access to a remedy 
for torture committed abroad, this necessarily implicates the question of the 
immunity of the perpetrators of that torture.81 The court added that:
The absence of any territorial dimension to the provision is significant. 
When the parties to the Convention Against Torture wished to limit 
their obligations to their respective territorial jurisdictions, they did so 
expressly. The obligations imposed by Articles 2(1), 5(1)(a), 5(2), 11, 
12, 13 and 16 of the Convention, for example, are limited or modified 
by the words “in any territory under its jurisdiction ...82
The court explains why, in its opinion, the omissions of the words “committed 
in any territory under its jurisdiction” from the final draft of art. 14 was neither 
a mistake nor an oversight.83 The court emphasises that “[s]ubsequent state 
practice and the views of the Committee against Torture further confirm that 
Article 14 does not embody a ‘mistake’, or that it is merely understood to be 
territorially limited”.84 It went ahead to outline this practice and views.85
In its General Comment on art. 14,86 the Committee against Torture 
explained that
[t]he Committee considers that the application of article 14 is not limited 
to victims who were harmed in the territory of the State party or by or 
against nationals of the State party. The Committee has commended 
the efforts of States parties for providing civil remedies for victims 
who were subjected to torture or ill-treatment outside their territory. 
79 Naït-Liman v Switzerland:par. 188.
80 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 
176.
81 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran:par. 215.
82 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran:par. 216.
83 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran:paras. 217-221.
84 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran:par. 222.
85 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran:paras. 223-226.
86 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3 (Implementation of art. 14 
by States parties) (13 December 2012) (CAT/C/GC/3).
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This is particularly important when a victim is unable to exercise the 
rights guaranteed under article 14 in the territory where the violation 
took place. Indeed, article 14 requires States parties to ensure that all 
victims of torture and ill-treatment are able to access remedy and obtain 
redress.87
The Committee against Torture stressed the fact that, for a victim of torture 
to obtain redress, it is not a requirement that the perpetrator should first be 
convicted. Thus, “[c]ivil liability should be available independently of criminal 
proceedings and the necessary legislation and institutions for such purpose 
should be in place”.88 The jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture 
shows that it does not agree with the submission that “the obligations to 
provide redress, compensation and rehabilitation contained in article 14 are 
limited to victims of acts of torture committed within the territory of the State 
party, or by or against one of its citizens.”89
It is evident from the above discussion that the question of whether art. 14 
of the Convention against Torture obliges states parties to establish universal 
civil jurisdiction in cases of torture is far from being settled. In my opinion, the 
drafting history of the Convention shows that the intention was to limit the 
application of art. 14 to acts of torture that had been committed in the territory 
of the state party. However, if a country goes ahead and ratifies a treaty that 
does not have this geographical limitation, one can argue that it did not have 
a problem with that provision; otherwise, it would have made a reservation or 
declarative interpretation of art. 14, as the United States did when it ratified 
the Convention against Torture.90 South Africa did not make a reservation 
or interpretative declaration on art. 14 of the Convention against Torture.91 
This implies that it does not object to establishing universal civil jurisdiction 
for torture. 
However, for one to be compensated for torture committed abroad, there 
has to be legislation on which a court should base its order for damages. It is 
against that background that South Africa’s Parliament included sec. 7 in the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act. Much as sec. 7 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act provides that nothing 
contained in the Act “affects any liability which a person may incur under the 
87 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3:par. 22.
88 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3:par. 26.
89 A.N. v. Switzerland, Decision, Communication No. 742/2016, U.N. Doc. CAT/
C/64/D/742/2016 (CAT, Aug. 03, 2018):par. 4.1 (the submission by the state 
party was rejected by the Committee).
90 When ratifying the Convention against Torture, the United States made several 
reservations, including the one to the effect that “it is the understanding of the 
United States that article 14 requires a State Party to provide a private right 
of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the 
jurisdiction of that State Party.” See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&clang=_en.
91 South Africa has made reservations or interpretative declarations on some of the 
treaties it has ratified. See Mujuzi 2008.
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common law or any other law”, South Africa has not yet enacted legislation 
providing for circumstances in which a person who has been tortured abroad 
can be awarded damages. This explains why the court did not refer to such 
legislation. In the absence of such legislation, one would have expected the 
court to explain whether common law was applicable. However, it did not. 
This creates room for the argument that there was no legal basis (legislative 
or common law) for the court to award the plaintiff damages for the torture 
committed abroad.  
The argument that there was no legal basis for the Court to award damages 
to the plaintiff for the torture committed against him abroad applies with 
equal force, if not more, to the court’s order awarding the plaintiff damages 
for unlawful arrest and detention. The court did not explain why, under the 
Equatorial Guinea law or international law, the arrest and detention of the 
plaintiff were unlawful.92 Even if it had found that the arrest and detention were 
unlawful according to Equatorial Guinea law, it did not have the jurisdiction to 
award the plaintiff damages against the defendant for violating foreign law. 
The facts of the case show that the court found that the rights of the plaintiff, 
as provided for in the South African Constitution and as expounded by South 
African courts, were violated. South African law is not of universal application 
and, therefore, the court erred in awarding the plaintiff damages for wrongful 
arrest and detention. 
4. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the above discussion that sec. 7 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Torture of Persons Act is silent on the question as to whether 
South African courts have jurisdiction to award damages to a victim of 
torture committed abroad. Since South Africa did not make a reservation or 
interpretative declaration on art. 14 of the UN Convention against Torture, it 
did not object to establishing universal civil jurisdiction in cases of torture. It is 
recommended that sec. 7 of the Act be amended to address this issue. This will 
ensure that citizens or residents of South Africa who are tortured abroad can 
obtain redress. This will also be in line with the practice and jurisprudence of 
the Committee against Torture. Sec. 7 should also be amended to specifically 
provide that a person who has been tortured is compensated on the basis of 
the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act. There is no need for 
a victim of torture to litigate before he or she can be awarded damages for 
torture. The government should establish a special fund for that purpose and, 
for example, empower one of the relevant Chapter Nine institutions or establish 
an ombudsperson to handle these claims. Since the coming into force of the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act, South African courts, 
including the Constitutional Court, have found that some people were tortured 
92 However, in Obiang v Van Rensburg and Another:par. 48, the applicant, then the 
respondent, argued that his arrest and detention were contrary to “constitutional 
and international law obligations to which Equatorial Guinea is subject”.
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and awarded damages.93 However, in this jurisprudence, courts neither refer 
to sec. 7 of the Act nor do they specify the amount of damages awarded for 
violating the right to freedom from torture.94 In some cases, courts find that the 
accused was tortured but he or she is awarded damages for assault.95 There 
is a need for courts to clearly specify the damages awarded for torture. This 
will, inter alia, show that courts take torture seriously and could be one of the 
ways in which to exert pressure on government to put in place measures to 
combat torture.96 
93 Mahlangu and Another v Minister of Police (CCT 88/20) [2021] ZACC 10 
(14 May 2021); Mzingeli and Others v Minister of Police (139/2015) [2019] 
ZAECMHC 68 (12 November 2019).
94 Mahlangu and Another v Minister of Police; Mzingeli and Others v Minister of 
Police.
95 See, for example, Ndlovu v Minister of Police (33237/2010; A5054/2013) [2018] 
ZAGPJHC 595 (11 October 2018); Mabota v MEC for Community Safety, In Re: 
Mabota v MEC for Community Safety (24878/2015) [2018] ZAGPJHC 64 (10 
April 2018); M and Others v Minister of Police and Others (9676/2013) [2021] 
ZAGPPHC 407 (8 June 2021) (in this case the court used assault instead of 
torture).
96 For some of the measures that the government is required to put in place to 
combat torture, see Sonke Gender Justice NPC v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2021 (3) BCLR 269 (CC); Khosa and Others v Minister 
of Defence and Military Defence and Military Veterans and Others [2020] 3 All 
SA 190 (GP); [2020] 8 BLLR 801 (GP); 2020 (5) SA 490 (GP); 2020 (2) SACR 
461 (GP).
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